UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
LOGISTICS OPERATIONS SCHOOL
MARINE CORPS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SCHOOLS
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MTAC 3403

STUDENT OUTLINE

STRATEGIC MOBILITY

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

1. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE: Given the billet of major subordinate command motor transport chief and references, identify key concepts in strategic mobilty, per the references. (35XX.08.03)

2. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

a. Given the billet of a major subordinate command motor transport chief and references, identify the concepts of amphibious shipping, per the references. 35XX.08.03a

b. Given the billet of a major subordinate command motor transport chief and references, identify the power projection capabilities concepts, per the references. (35xx.08.03b)

c. Given the billet of a major subordinate command motor transport chief and references, identify the concepts of the Maritime Prepostioning Force (MPF), per the references. (35xx.08.03c)

d. Given the billet of a major subordinate command motor transport chief and references, identify the concepts of the three MAGTF deployment pillars.

OUTLINE

1. STRATEGIC MOBILITY. Strategic mobility is defined as, “The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

2. MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES PLAN (MCP). The Marine Corps Capability Plan was first published in 1992 by CMC. It is the principle document presented to the warfighting Commanders-In-Chiefs (CINC). It provides the unified combatant commander (CINC’s) and joint staffs with the capabilities of the Marine

Corps and how we deploy. The MCP has two volumes and a classified supplement. You have been provided a copy of Volume I as a supplemental handout. You are encouraged to read the entire Volume. This class will cover Chapter 4, Marine Corps Deployment Concepts and Capabilities and highlight information contained in Chapter 5.

3. ADAPTIVE PLANNING.

a. Adaptive Planning. Adaptive planning is a concpet that requires the development of a range of options which encompass the elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military) that during deliberate planning can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. This concept provides for "***force modules***" that meet a specific operational requirement. This concept is not new to the Marine Corps; our MAGTF's are deployable modules. The options of diplomatic, political, economic and military or a combination thereof are referred to as Flexible Deterrent Options.

b. Flexible Deterrent Option . A planning framework intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options which are carefully tailored to send the right signal. These options normally include limited military forces and preplanned requests for economic, diplomatic, and political actions appropriate to particular military actions.

c. Crisis Action Modules (CAM). CAM's are pre-planned deployment packages which we use to build or shape our MATGF's both combined arms and special purpose. When builing CAM's planners must consider all three pillars of the ***strategic triad—airlift, sealift both amphibious & commerical, and pre-postioning.*** CAM's are used to fill requirements and are built to be modified by commanders and provide for flexiblity.

4. DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS.

a. Deployment Options

(1) Amphibious/Strategic Sealift. Forces deployed in amphibious and strategic shipping can deploy rapidly to an area of interest and loiter until the need for employment arises. These forces provide the only ***forcible entry capability*** and allow the greatest flexibility in time and method of employment.

(2) Airlift. Airlift has the advantage of speed, and need not sacrifice combat power or sustainability when deployed in conjunction with prepositioned equipment and supplies, such

as that carried aboard the MPS Squadron. To exploit this deployment means, Air Contingency Forces (ACF's) are established in each MEF to provide a credible force which can deploy with minimal notice.

(3) Prepositioning. Significant MAGTF capabilities are found in the maritime and geographic prepositioning programs.

(a) Maritime Prepositioning Force. MPF gives the unified CINC's a new dimension in mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness. All three squadrons have been reconfigured to support ***Crisis Action Modules*** and allow the option of using less than an entire squadron and associated MEB Forward in response to a crisis.

(c) Norway Prepositioning Program/Norway Air-Landed MEB(NALMEB). This program provides prepositioned supplies and combat equipment in southern Norway for an airlifted MEB.

b. Basing Types. While not deployment options, the concepts of ***forward-basing*** and ***sea basing*** are important to understanding the deployment and sustainment of Marine forces in theater.

(1) Forward-Basing. Forward-basing provides a readily deployable force that will not require long range staging and avoids the problems of the initial extended lines of communications.

(2) Sea Basing. Reliance on sea basing minimizes U.S. presence in-country and enhances tactical flexibility, mobility, and supportability. This concept allows for the provision of all combat service support from ships offshore.

c. Crisis Action Modules and Adaptive Planning. The Marine Corps has developed an array of improved deployment and force closure packages known as crisis action modules (CAM's). These modules are designed to support the requirements of adaptive planning. An example of the CINC's adaptive planning is having plans to provide Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Mobile Training Team (MTT's), recommend political options (trade sanctions/embargoes), recommend forces for a show-of-force, recommend commencement of deployment of defensive forces and/or offensive forces.

(1) CAM's are a logical outgrowth of the Marine Corps MAGTF approach to crisis response and warfighting. The MAGTF, in and of itself, is a ground, aviation, and sustainment "module".

(2) CAM's do not replace MAGTF employment doctrine. They merely provide the joint force commander with a MAGTF at reduced force closure "cost" in time and strategic lift.

(3) Adaptive planning requires the CINC to have flexible modules for various stages of crisis onset. The CAM's concept represents a philosophy much like the flexible options concept in adaptive planning.

(4) CAM's are preplanned packages of Marine Forces which match forces with available lift assets to give a required force capability – a MAGTF at the right time, at the right place.

(5) CAM's are also building blocks which provide options for the flow of Marine forces. Once a CAM has been developed it can be quickly adapted to fit the exact requirements of a particular crisis. It can either be modified or it can be combined with another CAM as the situation dictates.

(6) CAM's maximize the use of the joint pillars of strategic deployment (airlift, sealift and prepositioning). These pillars match the MAGTF deployment pillars:

- Strategic Airlift

- Amphibious/Strategic Sealift

- Maritime Prepositioning Ships and Aviation Logistics Support Ships (TAVB).

5. MAGTF DEPLOYMENT PILLARS.

a. The Marine Corps can deploy it's MAGTF's via a variety and a combination of means. Rather than deploying by a single option, MAGTF's which deploy via this concept integrates the use of all the assets available for both building and deploying focrces.

b. See the diagram labeled 1-1 which shows the three deployment pillars and the forces associated with each pillar. Each deployment pillar is also made up of the building blocks which allow a module to be organized for strategic movement and mission based upon the various lift available.



Figure 1-1

c. Traditionally these pillars have been used as vertical building blocks. That is, MAGTF's were built vertically, block by block, using only one of the deployment pillars.

d. Instead, this concept uses not only the vertical blocks, it blends horizontally across these once discrete deployment options. Thus, MAGTF's can be:

(1) built by combining elements of the Air Contingency Force, Amphibious Ready Forces, and Maritime Prepostioning Forces from all three MEFs and

(2) deployed by various combinations of the strategtic deployment options.

e. For example, in the following figure the majority of the troops, with limited equipment and sustainment are provided by the air contingency force which deploys via the airlift pillar. The amphibious MEU, with troops and equipment but limited sustainment, is provided by a forward-deployed Amphibious Ready Group (ARG/MEU (SOC) via the amphibious pillar. Finally, significant equipment and sustainment is provided by one of the reconfigured ships of the MPS squadron.

f. Another example of the flexibility CAM's bring to adaptive planning, the MPS squadron and/or the ARG/MEU(SOC) could have moved early to the crisis area as part of a flexible deterrent option (FDO).

g. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) amphibious deployments will continue as the means for providing a landing force with ***forcible entry capability***. This module concept is not meant to replace, but to supplement this capability.



Figure 1-2

h. Marine component commanders have each prepared several modules for a wide range of potential crisis and adaptive planning requirements. They continue to draft more. Unified commanders and Marine component commanders must coordinate to determine which modules are of potential use and to discuss the palpitation of additional modules which could fill in a planning void.

6. MARINE CORPS CONCEPTS AND ISSUES. The Marine Corps Concepts and Issues is a publication that CMC provides annually to the President, Congress, Department of Defense, Joint Staff, unified commanders (CINC's), and other government agencies. You have been provided a copy of the most recent issue. It is an outstanding publication. We have also provided you a copy of the Secretary of the Navy, CNO, and CMC white letter "From the Sea". This letter provides the vision for the Navy Marine Corps team of the future [e.g., Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF)]. We recommend you read "From-the-Sea" and refer to it often. The following are extracts from the 1997 Marine Corps Concepts and Issues.

a. **Amphibious Shipping**

(1) Discussion

-Naval expeditionary forces, with embarked Marines, provide the Nation with a flexible forward presence and crisis response force as well as the most formidable forcible entry capability in the world. The development and maintenance of these capabilities are the direct responsibility of the Marine Corps as directed by Congress in the Title X roles and mission legislation.

-Amphibious lift requirements are derived from assessments that were developed to support the National Military Strategy (NMS). Total lift capacity must be tailored with the right numbers and the right types of ships to meet real world day-to-day commitments as well as combat surge capabilities.

-Current Optempo requires at least twelve Amphibious Ready Group (ARGs) to meet U.S. forward presence commitments in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Western Pacific. Our big deck amphibious ships, the LHA/LHD, are the heart of every ARG. The USS IWO JIMA has been commissioned and after sea trials will be ready to join the fleet.

-The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) identified the need for enough amphibious lift to move 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigrades (MEB) equivants of surge lift. However, fiscal limitations have prevented us from reaching 3.0 MEBs of lift so the goal was reduced to 2.5 MEBs of lift.

-Considered the most complex of all military operations, the amphibious assault has been the forte of the Marine Corps since Guadalcanal, IWO Jima, and most recently during Desert Storm, the mere threat of such an assault off the coast of Kuwait tied up Iraq's defenses thus permitting the successful flanking attack to the west during the Gulf War.

(2) **Marine Corps Position**. Astute and thoughtful investment in the amphibious ship building program is required. Our Naval expeditionary forces recently received the 12th big deck to support worldwide forward presence. We support a near-term start-up of the LPD 17 program with a procurement profile that will provide funding for the quickest, most economical commissioning of all twevel ships.

b. **Power Projections Capabilities**

(1) **Discussion**. Rapidly projecting decisive military power is key to National Military Strategy (NMS) in which Marine amphibious and maritime prepostioning forces play a critical role. Revitalizing the necessary platforms and improving the effectiveness of these expeditionary forces is a major goal. To fully exploit development of these capabilities, the Marine Corps will consistently blend advances in technology with newly developed operational concepts. Today, the Navy-Marine Corps team is rapidly implementing our strategic and operational concepts of "Forward…from the Sea" and Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) to take full advantage of the littoral environment and the maneuvering space it provides. The following initiatives are key to the achievement of our operational objectives:

-***Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)*** is critical to our future ability to project power inland from amphibious ships. Increased speed and survivability allow a faster buildup of combat power ashore, ensuring greater force survival and effectiveness to fight the land battles. These capabilities expand our ability to implement tactical maneuvers from ship to objective area from over the horizon, creating significant operational advantages. The AAAV will replace the current AAV7A1 family of amphibious assault vehicles, which will reach the end of their service life within the next five years.

-***MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft*** (part helicopter/part fixed-wing aircraft) allows comabt power to transition ashore faster and increases the depth of the battlefield through its enhanced range, endurance, and flexibility. It replaces the aging medium lift CH-46 Sea Knights and CH-53 Sea Stallions. While fulfilling the Marine Corps critical medium lift requirement, the MV-22's increased capabilities provide significant tactical and operational leverage. The MV-22 is integral to making OMFTS a reality.

-***Maritime Prepositioning Force*** (Enhancement) alleviates shortfalls in the existing Maritime Prepostioning Ship (MPS) squadrons and provides new capabilities to correct deficiencies highlighted during ***Desert Storm***. These new ships will carry additional equipment and supplies to include: An expeditionary airfield, A Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, and fleet hospital equipment. The result will be a much more capable Maritime Prepostioning Force (MPF).

-***Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures (SWMCM)*** program is designed to improve critical deficiences in mine countermeasures. The development of technology and systems to detech, clear, and neutralize these threats is vital to allow our forces to maneuver

unencumbered throughout the littoral areas and to effectively project power ashore.

-***Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)*** is an essential dimension of our power projection capabilities. The current program is focused on development of high energy modification to the existing 5-inch/54 caliber gun and the Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM). This program is expected to meet Marine Corps operational requirements by FY-01. The long-term program calls for the development of a larger caliber gun and the ship-board adaptation of extended range missle systems similar to ATACMS, SEA SLAM, or standard strike variants. These enhancements will provide a critical boost to Marine amphibious capabilities and result in extended, more accurate, and more lethal support to maneuver forces ashore.

-***M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT)*** provides the direct fire needed by the Marine Corps in its role as the early arrival expeditionary force. As the Corps uses both its active and reserve tank battalions in responding to expeditionary operations, both components require and posses the lethality and survivability of the M1A1. To fulfill operational requirements, M1A1 tanks are embarked aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships.

(2) **Marine Corps Position**. Technological advances enable the Marine Corps to rapidly move OMFTS from the concept stage to reality. Our acquisition focus will be on the technological initiatives that improve the mobility, flexibility, and lethality of our Marine expeditionary forces in a cost-effective manner. Support for these programs will be in concert with both the National Military Strategy and the objectives of the Marines Corps in supporting this strategy.

c. **Medium Tactical Vehicle Remanufacturing Program**.

(1) **Discussion**. The primary mission of the Marine Corps medium tactical wheeled fleet is logistical support. This fleet transports general cargo, personnel, ammunition, bulk fuel, water, shelters, and standard containers in addition to being the prime mover for Marine Corps artillery. The fleet’s central logistical role and the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps require mobile, yet self-sustaining system that can maintain full mission capabilities pending buildup of extensive combat service support ashore. The current medium fleet is approaching the end of its economic useful life and requires improvements to overcome deficiences in off-road mobility, off-road speed, payload lift capacity (particularly for high density loads such as ammunition and bulk liquid), reliability, and maintainability.

-The Medium Tactical Vechile Remanufacturing (MTVR) Program is designed to correct these deficiencies by upgrading the current system through a remanufacturing process. Remanufacturing is preferred because it is more cost-effective than buying a new system. The program will intergrate commercially availble componenets into the current vehicle.

(2) **Marine Corps Position**. The MTVR will give the Marine Corps a fully mission-capable, robust vehicle to meet the demands of supporting Marine operational forces in increasingly difficult terrain. The MTVR program has validated the concept of integrating existing technology to improve mobility, payload, speed, reliability, and maintainability.

d. **Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters**.

(1) **Discussion**. The capability to dominate the battlespace requires the integration of the unique skills and abilities of each service. The focus of this integration takes place at the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ). With few exceptions, JTF HQs are ad hoc organizations established for a specific mission to manage and control assigned forces. As demonstrated in our past JTF experiences, compressed operational timelines and limited resources create potential disadvantages. We understand the provisional nature of JTF HQs may adversely impact operational capability. The Marine Corps desires to eliminate confusion during the initial stand-up, enhance progress in the conduct of joint operations, and maximize the valuable training experience gained by applying lessons learned in our prior JTF HQs experiences.

-The Marine Corps has experienced success in providing core capabilities for a JTF HQ for operations in Somalia and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In both cases, the headquarters was manned and equipped using MEF assets with augmentation from the joint community and other service components. Though operationally successful, these JTF HQs were also ad hoc organizations, and the tasking was in addition to other MEF mission requirements.

-Recognizing the advantages of continuity to effectively integrate service capabilities, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the establishment of a standing JTF HQ. This JTF HQ will allow exploitation of the expeditionary character and combined arms experience of the Marine Corps for rapid deployment. It will be organized, trained, and equipped to respond to crises ranging from forward presence to conflict resolution.

-In establishing the JTF HQ capability, the Marine Corps is working closely with the combatant commanders to coordinate

training and to ensure the needs of those commanders are met. This effort will contribute to joint capabilities and enhance the Marine Corps overall warfighting capabilities

(2) **Marine Corps Position.** The Corps will provide a fully capable, expeditionary, JTF HQ organized and equipped to move at a moment's notice to effectively meet a variety of contingencies. The objective is to provide a standing headquarters for the National Command Authority and the Unified CINCs to deploy in response to emerging crises anywhere in the world's littorals.

7. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY (MRS). Congress tasked the Department of Defense to determine future mobility requirements for the Armed Forces and develop an integrated mobility plan. The study effort began with analysis of logistics and warfighting aspects of potential regional crises set in 1999 using the following scenarios.

a. **Deployable Force Requirements.**

-Regional contingency in the Middle East or Persian Gulf [Major Regional Contingency (MRC-E)]

-Regional contingency on the Korean peninsula (MRC-W)

-Regional contingency in Europe,

-Regional contingency in Southeast Asia

-Regional contingency in the Western Hemisphere

-Two concurrent regional contingencies beginning sequentially.

b. In the scenario analyses, the following critical factors had an effect on US success.

-**US strategic orientation**

Alliance arrangement
Forward presence
Prepositioning alternatives

-**Speed in reacting to intelligence indications of aggression**

Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) employment
Access to US and allied shipping

-**Capability (size and training levels) of allied forces and support**

-**Capability (size and training levels) of enemy forces and support**

-**Concept of operations employed by the enemy**

c. War games were conducted and analyzed the effects of variations in the critical factors. From the analysis emerged key insights:

-**Middle East or Persian Gulf**: Success in this scenario requires additional mobility assets to close a heavy combat element into theater early and to reinforce rapidly with combat forces from the United States.

-**Korea**: Additional heavy forces available for use early in a conflict improved allied defensive capability.

-**Europe**: NATO sealift and airlift deliver forces necessary to achieve warfighting objectives.

-**Southeast Asia and Western Hemisphere**: Airfield availability and reception constraints limit rapid build up of power. Amphibious lift and direct delivery capability of the C-17 will significantly improve US success in these scenarios.

d. MRS Volume I Conclusion. The MRS has been a massive effort involving many officers and staffs of the Department of Defense. The study analyzed, compared, and revised many different conflict scenarios and mobility plans. The recent experiences of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM give both urgency and understanding to the analysis. The study's integrated mobility plan strikes the best balance among requirements, confidence in achieving mobility goals, and cost. The plan will provide the nation a strategically prudent and fiscally responsible deployment capability to protect the nation's interests in a turbulent future.

e. You have been provided a copy of the MRS Volume 1. It is recommended that you read the study to enhance your knowledge of how strategic issue are ascertained and impact the Marine Corps.

f. Volume II Key Points. Volume II is expanding information on the following:

(1) Concurrent Sequential Scenario Analysis. Lists the limitations in the mobility force if more than one major regional contingency occurs concurrently.

(2) CRAF Impact and Dedicated Aeromedical Evacuation. There are currently limitations in the number of CRAF airframes available for aeromedical evacuation (e.g., shortage of B767's committed to CRAF).

(3) FSS, LMSR, and RRF Siting and Readiness. There is a requirement for more layberths to outport RRF ships in a reduced operating status (ROS).

(4) Containerization of USAF Pre-positioned Ammunition. An initial analysis of the containerization of USAF pre-positioned ammunition suggests that there is no clear-cut advantage to be gained by immediately transferring ammunition for pre-positioned breakbulk ships to containerships.

(5) 463L Pallet Requirements. An initial analysis of airlift pallet requirements for a combined MRC-E and MRC-W scenario suggests two steps to provide sufficient pallets throughout the scenario:

-A build up of the currently insufficient pallet inventory.

-A maintenance of and "on call (i.e., C-day ready)" pallet production capabilities.

(6) Air Mobility Infrastructure (En Route Basing). As an excursion from the original MRS assumption that current infrastructure will be available, this analysis focuses on the severe impact of potential list infrastructure (airbases and personnel) in the mobility community, the ability to delivery forces to a theater of operations, and the recommended intertheater mobility program. For example, the loss of infrastructure at Rhein Mein, Torrejon, and Lajes sufficiently delays the closure of forces for the MRC-E scenario. This loss also significantly increases aerial refueling mission flying hours, significantly increasing fighter closure times, and, as a corollary effort, decreases overall airlift capacity. In addition to reducing wartime capability the lost of infrastructure also markedly reduces existing peacetime capacity to Serviced requirements in central Europe through German airfields at Rhein Mein and Ramstein. If significant loss of infrastructure does occur, a solution will be required.

(7) CONUS Infrastructure. Many details are provided concerning the following:

-Installation outloading capabilities and procedures at select origins

-West coast container ammunition outloading capability

-Adequate quantity and types of berths at key ports of embarkation

-Proper organization of port operations personnel

-Legislative authority to ensure priority service of commercial transportation facilities and services and early availability of transportation terminal units (TTU's) (TTU's are MTMC reserve units).

-To correct TTU deficiencies noted during DESERT SHIELD.

-Ongoing Transportation System Capabilities Studies (TSCS) at Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, MCAS Cherry Pt, MCAS El Toro, MCAS Beaufort and MCLB Albany. Several of these studies have already been completed.

(8) Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS) Excursion. This analysis examines, in a rather limited context a scenario modified to support LOTS operations.

(9) Assault Follow-On Echelon Shipping Analysis. In support of the MRS, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) initiated a study analyzing the strategic sealift support requirements for the Assault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE) of an amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) (today referred to as a MEF Forward) and its associated Naval Support Element. This study was as a result of the AFOE shipping that was assigned to 4th MEB for their deployment to DESERT SHIELD.

(a) Based upon this study, MRS Volume I recommends the outporting of 10 dry-cargo and 2 tanker Ready Reserve Ships on both the east and west CONUS coasts in support of surge MEB AFOE strategic sealift requirements.

(b) As a part of the landing force, along with the Assault Echelon of an Amphibious Task Force, the AFOE provides the assault forces and equipment required to support and sustain the assault.

I MRS Volume II provides the details of this study and identifies anticipated seaports of embarkation and the

required readiness levels of the ships supporting the surge MEB's AFOE's.

(d) These requirements have been included in USTRANSCOM's FSS, LMSR, and RRF Siting and Readiness Study Report.

(e) It must be noted that the MEB AFOE strategic sealift support analysis initiated by HQMC and reported in MRS Volume I does not represent the Marine Corps total strategic sealift support requirements, but only focuses on the surge MEB's. HQMC has conducted a similar analysis refining the AFOE strategic sealift support requirement for a Marine Expeditionary Force, which is to be included in MRS Volume III.

g. Volume III Key Points. MRS Volume III is in draft.

REFERENCES:

MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY
THE JOINT STAFF OFFICER GUIDE
JOINT VISION 2020
MARINE CORPS STRATEGY 21
COMMANDANT'S GUIDANCE
MAKING MARINES & WINNING BATTLES
USMC LOGISTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN

LIST OF SUPPORTING MATERIALS

1. HANDOUTS

Student Outline 3409-1, Student Outline
Student Handout 3409-2, MCP Volume I
Student Handout 3409-3, Forward From The Sea
Student Handout 3409-4, Marine Corps Concepts and Issues '97
Student Handout 3409-5, From-the-Sea
Student Handout 3409-6, Mobiliity Requirements Study (Exec Summ.)
Student Handout 3409-7, Operational Maneuver From the Sea

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